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A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories: 
Explaining Crises and Comparing Regionalisms
Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse
Abstract
This paper deals with two litmus tests for theories of European integration. The first part asks, how and to 
what extent various approaches can explain the contemporary crises of European integration. It thereby 
tackles the question whether European integration theories might have biased EU scholars towards ignor-
ing evidence for (dis-)integration. While being more optimistic about the state of the Union than many EU 
scholars are, the paper argues for a more differentiated conceptualization of integration as a continuous 
variable that takes disintegration rather than stagnation or no integration as the opposite value of integra-
tion. The second part of the paper asks to what extent European integration theories are able to shed light 
on experiences with regionalism across the globe. It argues that they do provide plausible accounts for 
the emergence of regionalism around the world. Comparing regions points to important scope conditions 
under which European integration theories operate. When it comes to outcomes, however, they need to 
be complemented by explanations emphasizing diffusion to explain why and when states are more inclined 
to pool and delegate sovereignty in some regions than in others.
The Authors
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1. The EU between Integration and Disintegration
1.1 Is the EU Dis-Integrating?
European integration theories want to explain why states seek to integrate rather than why they fail to 
do so. This has to do with their origins as International Relations theories. If “cooperation under anarchy” 
(Oye 1986) is already puzzling, integration presents even more of an anomaly in an international system 
that lacks a central enforcement power to solve collective action problems. There are a multitude of ways 
to conceptualize regional integration. Irrespective of whether focusing on the economic, political, or so-
cial dimension, most typologies distinguish between the issue areas, on which regional institutions have 
obtained the authority to decide, on the one hand, and the degree to which exercising regional authority 
interferes with state sovereignty over these issues, on the other (Börzel 2013; Lenz/Marks 2016). The 
dependent variable can take several values, which can be placed on a continuum whose opposite ends 
seem to be integration vs. no integration, stagnation, or “encapsulation” (Schmitter 1970a) rather than dis-
integration. Likewise, changes usually are analyzed in terms of more integration vs. stagnation. Moreover, 
(more) integration tends to be associated with supranationalism whereas intergovernmentalism stands 
for no or limited integration (Börzel 2013). The possibility of relapse or break-up is hardly systematically 
considered. This is less a deficiency of integration theories as such. Neo-functionalism considers spill-backs 
with member states withdrawing from previous commitments (Niemann et al. forthcoming; cf. Schmitter 
1970b; Schmitter/Lefkofridi 2016). Likewise, liberal intergovernmentalism discusses the possibility of 
member state governments as the “masters of the treaties” curbing the power of the European Court of 
Justice in case of serious agency slippage. National governments can also work around supranational insti-
tutions, such as majority voting, by using informal norms, opt-out clauses, and multi-track arrangements 
(Moravscik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming; cf. Garrett et al. 1998; Kleine 2013). 
The problem with theorizing disintegration seems to be that our universe of cases has lacked serious in-
stances of disintegration so far. Brexit could be one (Lequesne forthcoming). Alternatively, we might have 
simply missed them because we falsely coded the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 or the 
Eurosklerosis (sic) of the 1970s as mere stagnation of European integration rather than disintegration. This 
is different with the “polycrisis”1 the EU has been experiencing over the past decade. There is no denial that 
the situation has been serious, maybe even critical. Yet, for many EU scholars it seems to be a forgone con-
clusion that this time, the EU is doomed. In a forthcoming debate section with the Journal of European Public 
Policy the editors asked the contributors to a debate section “to re-evaluate our shared premise: that the 
EU, despite its inefficiencies and deficits, is here to stay” (Rittberger/Blauberger 2018: 436). The contributors 
followed the call and discussed the possibility of “destruction”, “termination”, “collapse”, “disintegration”, 
and a “cycle of authoritarianism” (Hodson/Puetter 2018; Jones 2018; Kreuder-Sonnen 2018). Their concerns 
are indicative of a certain mood of gloom and doom among EU scholars: the EU has largely failed to prevent 
the unfolding “polycrisis” and mitigate the hardship inflicted on people inside and outside its borders. 
Rather than engaging in such “doom and gloom” scenarios, this  takes a decidedly analytical stance. First, 
1 Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises 
(SEV), Athens, 21 June 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2293_de.htm; 31 October 2017.
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we conceptualize integration as a continuous variable with two opposite extreme outcomes: full-scale inte-
gration vs. full-scale disintegration.2 Accordingly, changes in the dependent variable entail more, less, or no 
integration/stagnation. Second, we need empirical indicators for measuring (more) integration and disinte-
gration. One of the earliest and most comprehensive endeavors in this regard was the work of Karl Deutsch. 
He defined international integration as the attainment of a “sense of community” and of institutions and 
mutual transactions strong enough to assure dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among a pop-
ulation of a given territory (Deutsch et al. 1957). Deutsch’s transactionalist theory denotes three major di-
mensions of integration: politics (institutions), economics (economic transactions/interdependence), and 
society (identity). While it is not always clear what is cause and what is effect, EU scholars have traced prog-
ress of integration along these three dimensions. Interdependence captures the economic transactions 
between states in terms of goods, capital, services, and labor. Institutions refer to the level and scope of EU 
competencies (Lindberg 1970) and the degree to which states pool and delegate sovereignty (Lenz/Marks 
2016). Identity, finally, taps into the sense of belonging to the EU in terms of support for membership and 
the feeling European (Risse 2010). With much ‘stop-and-go’, European integration has progressed along all 
three dimensions over the past 65 years. If there was to be disintegration now, we should see a decline in 
economic transactions, a renationalization of EU competencies, and/or a weakening sense of community.
Not least thanks to the quantitative turn in EU studies, plenty of time series data are now available and 
allow for measuring changes towards more or less integration over time. Trade and capital flows within 
Europe dipped at the height of the financial crisis but quickly recovered.3 So have, albeit more slowly, 
economic growth and employment. Support for EU membership and identification levels with Europe. 
have been equally recovering even in the debtor countries (Börzel/Risse 2018). The permissive consensus 
is gone, but it had started to erode long before the current fling of crises hit the EU (Van der Eijk/Franklin 
2004; Hooghe/Marks 2009). The EU’s attempts to stabilize the Euro zone resulted in a series of institutional 
reforms, including the Macro-Economic Imbalance Procedure, the European Fiscal Compact, the European 
Stability Mechanism, and the Banking Union. While not even touching the Treaties, these new institu-
tions considerably strengthen the EU’s authority in the area of fiscal and economic policy, particularly 
by delegating competencies to the European Commission and the European Central Bank (Börzel 2016a; 
Schimmelfennig 2014). Similar attempts failed with regard to the migration crisis. The member states ul-
timately rejected proposals for a semi-automated relocation of refugees. Nor did they approve plans for 
repatriating illegally staying third county nationals. At the same time, the member states agreed on a whole 
set of joint measures aiming at “sharing the responsibility” (Council of the European Union 2015) for the 
refugees who had already entered the territory of the EU, on the one hand, and managing future migra-
tion flows, on the other. Core measures include the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the 
transformation of FRONTEX into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, resettlement agreements 
with Turkey and several other countries, and the approval of a European Union Agency for Asylum (Börzel 
2016a). Likewise, the European Commission adopted a new framework to address systemic threats to the 
rule of law in Hungary and Poland in 2014, which is less cumbersome to activate since it does not need 
approval of the Council and the European Parliament (Kochenov/Pech 2016). Finally, the member states 
2 The following draws on Börzel (2018).
3 Eurostat 2017: International Trade in Goods, in: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
International_trade_in_goods; 18 November 2017.
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have shown remarkable unity and resolve in the negotiations over BREXIT with the British government. 
There seems to be little evidence for a dissolution or breakdown of economic ties, political institutions, 
and Europeanized identities. This is not to say that there are no signs of disintegration. However, they may 
concern dimensions of integration, the literature has neglected. If we do not find compelling evidence for 
disintegration, maybe our search has been tainted by theories that have missed important dimensions of 
our dependent variable beyond economic transactions, regional institution-building, and European identity. 
There must be a reason why EU scholars are worried about the future of European integration and the EU. 
Rather than interdependence, institutions, and identities, they should be concerned about discursive and 
behavioral practices that could turn into disintegration. Nationalist exclusionary discourses and non-compli-
ance with existing (legal) commitments are not the same as disintegration. Yet, they may reinforce each other 
and eventually undermine “integration through law” when populist movements challenge its very legitimacy. 
With the various crises unfolding, discourses about Europe and the EU have become increasingly nation-
alist and exclusionary (Wodak forthcoming). The recent electoral success of populist politicians that advo-
cate an illiberal Europe of sovereign nation states, which is protectionist and anti-Islam, have the potential 
to undermine the liberal foundations of the European Union and its member states. So do the attempts 
of Hungarian Prime Minister Orban and the Polish PiS government to control the media and the judiciary 
(Kelemen forthcoming). Yet, democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland is not the same as authoritarian 
rule as we find in Belarus or Azerbaijan. Moreover, Emanuel Macron demonstrated that the silent majority 
of Europeans, which public opinion surveys still find to adhere to liberal values, can be mobilized to win 
elections. At the same time, nationalist populism not only impedes national governments from agreeing on 
workable policies at the EU level but also undermines their compliance with already adopted EU laws and 
agreements. The failure to come up with common European solutions further fuels nationalist populism. 
The “politics of fear” (Wodak 2015), which centre-right parties increasingly have bought into, continues to 
undermine compliance with already existing EU law.
Practices that are not consistent with EU law do not necessarily undermine the functioning of the EU. 
In fact, a polity seeking to integrate 28 states, which are ever more heterogeneous, may need a certain 
amount of non-compliance or “institutionalized hypocrisy” (Iankova/Katzenstein 2003) to balance unity 
and diversity. Non-compliance, however, turns into a systemic risk of disintegration when member states 
refuse to incur compliance costs altogether contesting the authority of the Commission as the guardian of 
the treaty or the validity of EU law as such. 
Compliance has become increasingly politicized. Nationalist and populist politicians do not only resent the 
Euro and Schengen. Victor Orban, Marine Le Pen, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Alexander Gauland, Geert Wilders, 
or Nigel Farage deny the EU the authority to make and enforce rules on issues that interfere with national 
sovereignty. The politicization of the EU’s authority to set and enforce rules is likely to intensify if govern-
ments continue to mask distributional conflicts as regulatory problems, whose solutions lies with stricter 
rules and tougher enforcement instead of mutualizing the adjustment costs in the form of bailouts, euro 
bonds or fiscal equalization schemes. Non-compliance then becomes a way for member states to dodge 
adjustment costs, which regulatory policy, such as the austerity rules of the European Fiscal Compact or 
the principle of first contact of the Dublin regime, shifts to the implementation at the domestic level rather 
8 | KFG Working Paper No. 85 | May 2018 
than addressing them at the decision-making stage at the EU level (Börzel forthcoming).
In sum, measurements of integration and disintegration do not confirm the “doom and gloom” assess-
ments, which appear to prevail in EU studies these days, but reveal a more differentiated picture. On the 
one hand, the EU reaction to the Euro and the sovereign debt crises in (mostly) Southern member states 
resulted in more rather than less integration including empowering the EU Commission as well as the 
European Central Bank (ECB). On the other hand, the refugee flows and the resulting migration crisis led 
to widespread non-compliance of member states with EU rules and regulations, even though the initial 
EU reaction was more rather than less integration. Yet, non-compliance is not the same as disintegration, 
even it might result in the latter over time. As to Brexit, the (likely) departure of one member state has not 
changed the course of integration among the remaining 27. On the contrary, the EU has stood firm with 
regard to the core principles of the single market and the Schengen agreements, as the “divorce” negotia-
tions with the UK reveal.
What has changed, though, is the increasing politicization of EU politics in many member states, fostered 
by the rise of (mostly right-wing) populist movements and parties. These groups have started mobilizing 
anti-EU attitudes in many member states, which had been silenced by the political elites for years. It is too 
early to tell what the consequences for European integration will be.
How do the various theories of integration discussed in this paper explain the contemporary dynamics in the EU?
• Measurements of integration and disintegration do not support concerns about the EU’s fall or demise.
• The main challenge for the EU is the increasing politicization of EU politics, which undermines compli-
ance with EU rules and regulations.
1.2 Theorizing Integration and Disintegration in the EU
Not only is there a general sense that the EU may be disintegrating. Many EU scholars feel that that “existing the-
oretical arguments – transactionist, neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist, institutionalist – are ill-equipped 
to go in reverse” (Jones 2018: 440). But are they? If theories can explain why European integration has moved 
forward, reversing their causal logic should be able to explain why it is not or may relapse. Yet, as argued above, 
no (further) integration is not the same as disintegration. Moreover, different European integration theories 
are far from failing when it comes to explaining crises and their outcomes. They certainly have limits, which, 
however can be overcome by combining different approaches (see e.g. Kelemen forthcoming; Niemann et al. 
forthcoming; Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming; Börzel forthcoming and Risse forthcoming).
As to the Euro crisis, theories of fiscal federalism (Kelemen forthcoming) explain that federal systems with 
a common currency and single market face a moral hazard problem that can be dealt with either by apply-
ing strict “no bailout” clauses or by putting strong legal limits on state borrowing. The Maastricht Treaty 
attempted to do both, but when Greece almost defaulted, the Euro zone members decided to bail out the 
 A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories | 9
country in exchange of putting judicially enforceable balanced budget requirements in place. As Kelemen 
argues (forthcoming), theories of fiscal federalism also explain why this strategy is unlikely to work.
Liberal intergovernmentalism adds to this an emphasis on the diverging economic policy prefer-
ences between Northern Europe with its export-led growth strategies, on the one hand, and Southern 
European demand-led growth policies, on the other hand (Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming; also 
Schimmelfennig 2015). These divergences have been around for decades and have been papered over by 
the Maastricht Treaty establishing the single currency. When the exogenous shock hit the Euro zone in the 
late 2000s, hard intergovernmental negotiations ensued resembling a game of chicken and leading to a 
highly asymmetric bargain in favor of the more powerful Northern creditor states. While this might be the 
case, liberal intergovernmentalism has a hard time to account for the increased integration steps including 
the further empowerment of the European Commission and the extraordinary authority assumed by the 
independent European Central Bank (ECB) during the crisis (see Börzel/Risse 2018).
In contrast, neofunctionalism correctly predicts this push toward further integration during the Euro crisis 
and the policy entrepreneurship of the European Commission and the ECB toward further supranation-
alism (Niemann et al. forthcoming). However, as Niemann, Lefkofridi, and Schmitter argue , neofunction-
alism would not have foreseen that the resulting politicization of EU affairs would turn against further 
integration as promoted by Eurosceptic movements and parties. Rather and according to neofunctionalism, 
politicization is supposed to lead to further integration.
Yet, both liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, particularly as discussed by Niemann, 
Lefkofridi, and Schmitter (forthcoming; but see Haas 2001), are firmly embedded within a rational insti-
tutionalist framework. An alternative account of the Maastricht Treaty and the crises responses of the EU 
points to path-dependent processes and incremental changes as emphasized by historical institutionalism 
(Pollack forthcoming). From this perspective, the setup of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) cannot be regarded as a rational response to some functional pressures, but as “inefficient” histor-
ical responses following previously enshrined scripts of European integration. The same holds true for the 
incremental and piecemeal responses to the “critical juncture” of the Euro crisis. Given this incremental 
path-dependency, Pollack is deeply skeptical that the EU responses to the crisis will be sufficient to restore 
the viability of the Euro zone (Pollack forthcoming). 
In a similar vein, governance approaches (Börzel forthcoming) reveal that the equilibrium between inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism that has been constitutive for the European Union from its very 
beginnings has not changed. The Euro crisis has strengthened both supranational centralization and inter-
governmental coordination. Neither, however, is likely to tackle effectively the increasingly redistributive 
conflicts in the Eurozone pitching the Northern and Southern member states against each other. 
Neither liberal intergovernmentalism nor neofunctionalism ultimately offer a good account for the origins 
of the diverging economic preferences of Northern European “creditor” and Southern European “debtor” 
countries, since both approaches tend to exogenize actors’ interests taking them for granted. The particular 
strength of critical political economy is to provide an explanation for these divergences (Apeldoorn/Horn 
forthcoming; see also Matthijs/Blyth 2015). As Apeldoorn and Horn argue, the European Economic and 
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Monetary Union (EMU) constitutes a particular manifestation of a neoliberal project for the EU. Moreover 
and from a feminist perspective, Galligan (forthcoming) highlights the gendered nature of the various neo-
liberal policy prescription leading to the neglect of, e.g., female unemployment during the crisis. The Euro 
crisis itself exposed the internal contradictions of this project, namely the ever-increasing structural diver-
gences and heterogeneities in the Euro zone. When the international economic and financial crisis hit the EU, these 
divergences were exposed leading to the Euro crisis. Critical political economists are deeply skeptical about the 
various measures adopted be EU institutions to mitigate the crisis (Apeldoorn/Horn forthcoming). Furthermore, 
these measures are likely to exacerbate further gender inequalities inside the EU (Galligan forthcoming).
With regard to the migration crisis, liberal intergovernmentalism posits rather stable state preferences in 
the EU with regard to controlling migration flows in light of substantial domestic opposition to large num-
bers of refugees and migrants (Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming; see also Biermann et al. 2017). 
The position of the various governments is then determined by their status as “front line”, “transit,” or 
“destination” countries. The bargaining resulted in asymmetrical agreements with regard to border control 
(putting the “front line” states at a disadvantage), but not concerning the distribution of refugees given the 
divergence of preferences. Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism correctly explains why the migration crisis 
has led to stalemate and to increased non-compliance with previously agreed-upon rules and agreements. 
In contrast, neofunctionalism would have predicted further integration steps even in the migration crisis 
given the economic incentives not to put the Schengen agreements and a Europe of open borders into 
jeopardy (Börzel/Risse 2018). Besides, the demographic crisis in Europe should have led to a much more 
welcoming attitude towards migrants.
Identity politics explains to a large degree why the latter did not happen. Eurosceptic and (mostly right-
wing) populist movements dominated the discourse on migrants (Wodak forthcoming) thereby tapping into 
and mobilizing exclusionary and nationalist identities among the European populace (Risse forthcoming; 
see also Börzel/Risse 2018). Thus, social constructivism and discourse theory explain where the (anti-mi-
grant) preferences came from and became politically salient which liberal intergovernmentalism takes for 
granted. Governance approaches point to an important source of the increasing politicization not only of 
EU policies but also of the EU polity as such. The EU system of multilevel governance has emerged to make 
and regulate markets. The member states have refused to grant the EU much redistributive powers. Trying 
to tackle redistributive conflicts over the sharing of adjustment costs in the Euro crisis or the allocation of 
refugees in the migration crisis by regulatory governance fuels Euroscepticism and empowers nationalist 
populism. Both supranational centralization and intergovernmental coordination isolate controversial de-
cisions from domestic politics by having them taken by independent regulatory agencies or heads of states 
behind closed doors (Börzel forthcoming).
In sum, the various theories of European integration offer various accounts of the Euro as well as the 
migration crises. Some of these accounts contradict each other. E.g., liberal intergovernmentalism em-
phasizes crisis bargains among EU member states (Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming), while neo-
functionalism highlights the agenda-setting roles followed by the further empowerment of supranational 
institutions (Niemann et al. forthcoming). In contrast to both, historical institutionalism emphasizes path 
dependencies and “inefficient histories” (Pollack forthcoming). Likewise, governance approaches see the 
important changes not so much in the constitutional equilibrium between intergovernmentalism and 
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supranationalism but the nature within the two logics of EU policy-making (Börzel forthcoming). Critical 
political economy focuses on the underlying material conditions to account for the crises (Apeldoorn 
and Horn forthcoming), while social constructivism, feminist as well as discourse theories point to social 
sense-making, interpretations, and (gender) identities as underlying the preferences of actors (Risse forth-
coming; Galligan forthcoming and Wodak forthcoming). 
At the same time, some of the arguments complement each other. Federalist theories, liberal intergovern-
mentalism, neofunctionalism, but also historical institutionalism and governance approaches emphasize 
the various bargaining processes at the intergovernmental and supranational levels (see various chapters 
in Wiener et al. forthcoming). Yet, these approaches mostly exogenize actors’ interests and preferences 
which is the focus of social constructivism (identities, see Risse forthcoming), critical political economy 
(economic conditions, Apeldoorn/Horn forthcoming), feminist theory (Galligan forthcoming), and dis-
course approaches (Wodak forthcoming). As Legro has argued quite some time ago, theories accounting 
for the origins of preferences can be combined with theories explaining the negotiation processes in the 
“cooperation two step” (Legro 1996; see also the emphasis on the “mosaic” of integration theories in Diez/
Wiener forthcoming; on the pitfalls of such bridge-building exercises see, however, Checkel 2013).
• Many theories of European integration have difficulties in accounting for the diverging outcomes of 
the EU’s multiple outcomes. 
• Endogenizing member state preferences by focusing on identities and discourses provides for a better 
understanding of the EU’s crises and their outcomes.
2. Travelling beyond Europe: The Challenge of Comparative Regionalism
As argued above, theories of European integration are still in their “zone of comfort” when dealing with the 
various EU crises of the past decade. It is simply not true that these theories have little to contribute to the 
explanation of the crisis and the EU responses to it (as some have claimed with regard to processes of dis-
integration, see Rosamond 2016). Yet, European integration theories took off in Europe, where regionalism 
from the very beginning was meant to go beyond trade liberalization through inter-state bargains (Börzel 
2013: 504-507). While initial attempts at theory building where not confined to Europe (Mitrany 1943; 
Hoffmann 1956; Haas 1964; Nye 1970; Schmitter 1970b), they got increasingly refined to accommodate 
the dynamics of the European integration process and its supranational outcomes. Integration became 
practically synonymous with European integration and the EU served as the yardstick for measuring re-
gional integration in other parts of the world. Students of regionalism outside Europe felt that EU research 
held little on offer to them. Using European integration theories would amount to ethno-centrism impos-
ing “Western” concepts, approaches and research agendas onto other regions and ignoring the distinct his-
torical, cultural, social, political and economic context in which they emerged (Acharya 2016; Söderbaum 
2016). The “comparative turn” in area studies in the early 2000s has helped overcome the divide between 
EU studies and research on regionalism in other parts of the world. The emerging field of comparative 
regionalism takes it as an empirical question how far European integration theories travel in explaining the 
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emergence of regionalism, its outcomes, and its effects in other parts of the world (Börzel/Risse 2016a).4
Given the specific historical context in which the project of European integration emerged, it is indeed 
not obvious that European integration theories have anything to say about the creation of regional orga-
nizations in other parts of the world, where states are not necessarily liberal democracies and advanced 
market economies. This ‘liberal’ bias appears to limit the applicability of liberal (sic!) intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming), neofunctionalism (Niemann et al. forthcoming), critical political 
economy approaches (Apeldoorn/Horn forthcoming), and normative theories (Bellamy/Lacey forthcom-
ing) to the OECD world of industrialized liberal democracies. 
In order to evaluate how standard theories of (European) integration travel to other world regions, we have 
mapped the various regional orders across the world using rather rough estimates of economic interdepen-
dence, on the one hand, and degrees of regional cooperation and integration, on the other. While the x-axis of 
Figure 1 maps degrees of economic interdependence (or regionalization), the y-axis distinguishes degrees of 
(intergovernmental) cooperation and (supranational) integration, i.e., the pooling and delegating of authority 
unto the regional level (on this distinction see Hooghe/Marks 2015). What does Figure 1 tell us?
Figure 1: Regional Cooperation and Integration
Source: Modified version of Figure 27.2 in Börzel and Risse (2016b: 629).
4 The following summarizes Börzel (2016b), Risse (2016), and Börzel/Risse (2016b).
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First, Europe and the EU are on their own with both high degrees of economic interdependence and re-
gional integration. Second, Southeast Asia, Eurasia (that is, Russia and the various successor states of the 
Soviet Union, see Hancock/Libman 2016), and the Middle East are roughly located on a diagonal line of 
more or less similar degrees of interdependence and regional cooperation/integration. Third, four world 
regions show rather counter-intuitive patterns. The Sub-Saharan Africa and the Latin American regions 
are characterized by low and medium degrees of economic interdependence coupled with compara-
tively high levels of regional integration including some supranational institutions (overviews in Bianculli 
2016; Hartmann 2016). The opposite is true for both North America (the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA)) and Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan): very high degrees of economic inter-
dependence coupled with mostly intergovernmental regional cooperation schemes. How do the theories 
of (European) integration fit with this overall picture?
Classical cooperation theories in international relations (see e.g. Keohane 1989; Keohane/Nye 1977) of 
which both liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are derivatives (Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig 
as well as Niemann et al. forthcoming), posit that economic interdependence fosters cooperation and 
integration. The higher the degree of economic interdependence, the more we would expect regional in-
tegration so as to solve the likely conflicts, enable economic exchanges, and insure credible commitments. 
The four regions placed roughly on the diagonal line of Figure 1 appear to fit the bill – with Europe/the EU 
and the Middle East (Valbjorn 2016) on opposite ends and Southeast Asia (the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), see Jetschke/Katada 2016) as well as Eurasia (Hancock/Libman 2016) in between. 
In other words, roughly half of the regional cooperation and integration schemes in the world can be 
accounted for by classical functional theories of integration. This is not too bad for theories originally 
developed to accounting for the very special circumstances of European integration.
But what about the remaining world regions? Let us start with Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. These 
two world regions are characterized by comparatively low/medium levels of economic interdependence, 
but quite some degrees of political integration including supranational institutions (note that the African 
Union and other African regional organizations allow for military interventions in member states in cases 
of coup d’états and unconstitutional changes of governments, see Hartmann 2016). If we relax strong 
assumptions about economic interdependence and allow for other functional reasons to engage in coop-
eration, regional integration in both Latin America and Africa can actually be accounted for. Liberal inter-
governmentalism, for instance, argues that national governments seek to isolate political decisions with 
redistributional consequences from particularistic domestic interests by transferring them to the EU level 
(Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming; cf. Milward 1992). Such a political rationale may apply to regions 
that lack economic interdependence as a major driver for regionalism. African and Latin American leaders, 
democratic or not, have supported regional integration as a way to control, manage and prevent regional 
conflict, deal with non-traditional security threats or as a source of domestic power and consolidation of 
national sovereignty (Graham 2008; Caballero-Anthony 2008; Herbst 2007; Okolo 1985; Acharya 2011; 
Barnett/Solingen 2007). Weak states, in particular, have been inclined to engage in such “regime-boosting 
regionalism” (Söderbaum 2004) because they are more dependent on economic growth to forge domestic 
stability, tackle societal problems, and strengthen their international standing in terms of bargaining power 
and legitimacy (Clapham 1996). Moreover, non-state actors can more easily circumvent their governments 
in seeking transnational exchange (Bach 2005). Finally, regionalism has served as a tool for settling conflicts 
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and securing peace among (former) rival nations (Oelsner 2004; Acharya 2001; Francis 2006; Gruber 2000) 
and, more recently, for consolidating and promoting democracy in member states (Pevehouse 2005). What 
national governments lose in authority to regional institutions, they gain in legitimacy and problem-solving 
capacity, particularly since many societal problems and non-traditional security threats, such as environ-
mental pollution, pandemics, drug trafficking or migration, are no longer confined to the boundaries of the 
nation-state (cf. Börzel/van Hüllen 2015a). It is important to note in this context that European integration 
started with solving security issues, too. The European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS) was as much 
about containing post-World War II West Germany and providing security for its neighbours (France!) as 
it was about economic cooperation. Conveniently, Moravcsik’s historical and liberal intergovernmentalist 
account starts with the Treaty of Rome rather than with the ECCS (Moravcsik 1998).
Functional theories of regional integration appear to do a reasonably good job at accounting for regional 
cooperation and integration in six of eight world regions. Yet, they fail with regard to both North America 
and Northeast Asia, the latter being the economically most dynamic region of the world. With regard to 
NAFTA, the low level of regional integration and the lack of WTO+ dispute settlement systems (see Alter/
Hooghe 2016) are inconsistent with the degree of economic interdependence in this part of the world. 
Concerning Northeast Asia, things are even more puzzling against the backdrop of functional theories of 
cooperation and integration. Not only is Northeast Asia among the economically most interdependent 
regions of the world (second only to the EU region). There exists also one of the most acute security dilem-
mas of the world (e.g. the dispute over islands in the South and East China seas, the North Korean nuclear 
build-up). If security interdependence explains regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, it should do 
even more so in Northeast Asia. Yet, we observe an almost complete lack of formal institutions to deal with 
interdependence conflicts – be they economic or security-related – in this part of the world.
Governance approaches can help overcome the statist and formal institutionalist bias of major European 
integration theories thereby strengthening their explanatory power (Börzel 2016c). Governance gives 
equal status to state and non-state actors and does not prioritize formal over informal institutions. By 
avoiding to privilege either the state or formal institutions, governance approaches provide a “framework 
that can address the complexity of regional organizations/regionalism and at the same time transcend 
the case of Europe/EU itself” which scholars of both EU studies and new regionalism have called for 
(Söderbaum/Sbragia 2010: 568; Söderbaum 2016). It equally captures varieties of regionalism in areas 
where the capacity of the state to set and enforce is limited, civil society is weakly institutionalized, and 
neither state nor market actors are constrained by effective rule of law. For instance, informal practices of 
rent-seeking policies offer a compelling explanation for the “Spaghetti Bowl” of overlapping, often ineffec-
tive regional organizations in Sub-Sahara Africa (Söderbaum 2012). Strong networks of informal coopera-
tion among business actors may also explain why no strong formal institutions have emerged in Northeast 
Asia (Katzenstein/Shiraishi 1997).
Social constructivists have offered their own account for the lack of formal institutions of regional integration 
in Asia. Constructivist approaches put norms, identities, and discourses as ideational drivers of regionalism at 
center stage (Risse forthcoming). Long before the constructivist turn in International Relations (Adler 2013), 
transactionalism argued that successful integration requires a sense of community (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler/
Barnett 1998; Acharya 2001). It is unclear, however, whether collective identity is a precondition for or rather an 
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indicator of regional integration and whether there are any causal effects one way or the other (Checkel 2016). 
Cultural differences and collective identities – the “Asian way” – have been invoked to explain the reluctance 
of Asian states to engage in the building of strong regional institutions (Acharya 2004; Katzenstein 2005; 
Nesadurai 2009). Yet, these cultural explanations have an essentialist flavour to it and overlook that regions 
are not “cultural containers,” but that cultural influences have been flowing back and forth in time and space. 
Moreover, African and Latin American countries share some of the cultural traits of their Asian counterparts, 
such as the (post-)colonial experience, which are supposed to render them more sensitive about their national 
sovereignty. Yet, while regionalism in Asia and Latin America is about protecting sovereignty, African states 
have been willing to pool and delegate their sovereignty at the regional level to an extent that goes at times 
beyond the European Union. Moreover and despite the “Asian way” rhetoric, Southeast Asia and ASEAN have 
gradually moved forward toward formal regional institution-building thereby “copying and pasting” those el-
ements of EU institutions which have been deemed suitable for the region (Jetschke/Katada 2016; Jetschke/
Murray 2012). It remains puzzling, though, why Northeast Asia has not moved along a similar path with schol-
ars giving different answers (Hemmer/Katzenstein 2002; Jones/Smith 2007; Acharya 2011; Dent 2012). 
In sum, functional theories of regional cooperation and integration – whether federalism, liberal intergov-
ernmentalism, or neofunctionalism (see Kelemen forthcoming, Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig forthcoming, as 
well as Niemann et al. forthcoming) – offer a surprisingly plausible account of regionalism beyond Europe, 
once one adds security concerns and “regime boosting” to the list of reasons why states engage in regional 
cooperation and integration. Historical institutionalism (Pollack forthcoming), governance approaches 
(Börzel forthcoming) and social constructivism (Risse forthcoming) complement these explanations through 
their emphasis on path dependent processes, informal institutions and non-state actors, on the one hand, 
and community-building (or the lack thereof), on the other. Once regions are set on a path toward integra-
tion, they very rarely reverse course and is often sustained by informal institutions, as region-building in 
Latin America, Eurasia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia demonstrate. In contrast, lack of collective 
identity might be able to explain why North America and Northeast Asia are not inclined to engage in “in-
complete contracting” through multi-purpose regional institutions, since these could not survive without 
some sense of community, at least among the social, economic, and political elites (Marks et al. 2013).
This brings us to our last point with regard to comparative regionalism. Figure 1 above represents a one-
time picture of the current situation with regard to regional orders. However, if we consider developments 
over time, we can observe that the number of new regional organizations has not only increased over the 
past 30 years; already existing forms of regionalism have deepened and broadened (cf. Börzel/Risse 2016a: 
Chapters 14-21). Major regional organizations outside Europe, including the Arab League, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Mercosur, aspired 
to deeper forms of trade and monetary integration. They have also taken on new tasks in the realm of ex-
ternal and internal security, dealing with issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, territorial 
disputes, domestic political stability, migration, terrorism, or human trafficking. Interestingly, states have 
been more willing to delegate political authority, e.g., to regional courts, than to pool it (Lenz/Marks 2016). 
At the same time, they have agreed to formalize decision-making procedures, opening them, albeit reluc-
tantly, for majority decisions and parliamentary representation. 
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While the EU is still in a league of its own, the broadening and deepening of regionalism elsewhere, has made 
it less unique and more comparable. Integration theories have little difficulty explaining why regionalism 
emerges in the first place. Their main challenge is to explain why regionalism in some parts of the world, 
policy sectors, or times involves more or less integration. The various approaches have one major short-
coming in common: They all assume independent decision-making. Regional cooperation and integration 
are conceptualized as reactions to some problems in the region itself. Yet, regions do not exist in splendid 
isolation from each other. What if regional integration in one part of the world sparks similar attempts in 
other regions? Diffusion approaches theorize how regional institutions spread across continents (Risse 2016). 
As Katzenstein has argued, for example, regional institution-building forms part of a global script diffusing 
around the world (Katzenstein 2005). Moreover, regional organizations and their member states seeking 
particular institutional solutions seem to adopt designs which they consider legitimate. ASEAN is a case in 
point (Jetschke/Murray 2012). The need for international legitimacy motivated ASEAN to set up a dispute set-
tlement mechanism. Emulation has also driven the recent deepening and broadening of ASEAN, whose new 
Charter bears some striking resemblance with EU institutions (Jetschke 2010; Katsumata 2009). Likewise, 
ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, might be following a global script that entails the 
establishment of certain regional institutions and for which the EU provides a reference model (Koitsch 2012).
If we focus on such “recipient driven” diffusion mechanisms (Risse 2016), we can also explain more easily 
why we observe not much institutional convergence. Regional organizations tend to adopt particular insti-
tutional designs in a selective manner. The principle of parliamentary assemblies attached to regional orga-
nizations, for instance, has been diffused widely (Rittberger/Schroeder 2016), but the European Parliament 
as a supranational and directly elected parliament with increasing decision-making power remains a rare 
exception. While ASEAN emulated the EU Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), it made 
sure that this did not lead to a pooling of decision-making power, which would have violated the sover-
eignty principle. In other words, cognitive and normative priors within a region are key to understand the 
selective adaptation of specific institutional models and the resulting behavioural practices (Acharya 2004, 
2009; Checkel 2001). Thus, localization resulting in selective adaptation of institutional scripts seems to be 
the rule of the game (Acharya 2004; cf. Börzel/van Hüllen 2015b). We observe very little mimicry in terms 
of the full-scale download of particular institutional solutions from some global script. 
In sum, diffusion makes it abundantly clear that regions do not exist in splendid isolation of each other. We must 
not fall prone to “methodological regionalism” by assuming “relatively homogeneous, delineated, mutually 
exclusive, ‘natural’ world regions” (Holbig 2015: 12). There is ample evidence of interaction, mutual entangle-
ment and diffusion processes (Risse 2016). Diffusion theories allow capturing the interconnectedness of regions. 
• Theories of European integration travel well to other regions. They offer plausible accounts of region-
alism beyond Europe.
• The broadening and deepening of regionalism around the world have made the EU less unique and 
more comparable. 
• The main challenge for theories of European integration is to explain why regionalism in some parts of 
the world, policy sectors, or times involves more or less integration.
 A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories | 17
3. Conclusions
In this paper, we have adopted two tests for various theories of European integration. The first is whether 
they are able not only to explain integration, but also crises and dis-integration in the EU. European inte-
gration theories pass this first test with flying colors. However, we have to admit that this first test primarily 
refers to explanations with regard to the various crises, which the EU currently faces – from the Euro crisis 
to the migration challenges and Brexit. The various theories of European integration can indeed account for 
these crises. As to dis-integration, we have yet to see reversals of European integration. In contrast to what 
some scholars argue, the various crises have resulted in further integration steps (Euro crisis), stagnation 
and widespread non-compliance (migration challenges), and – interestingly enough – again further inte-
gration (Brexit, namely with regard to EU defense policies). There has been no dis-integration so far. Thus, 
we simply do not know whether the various integration theories pass this litmus test.
The second test for the various integration theories is whether they are able to travel beyond the European 
experience. The field of comparative regionalism is currently blooming (overview in (Börzel/Risse 2016a) 
and we have to ask whether European integration theories have any purchase with regard to the increasing 
efforts at regional cooperation and integration across the world. Here, the answer appears to be “yes, but.” 
As we have argued above, functional theories of cooperation and integration – such as federalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, and neofunctionalism (see Kelemen forthcoming, Moravcsik/Schimmelfennig, as 
well as Niemann et al. forthcoming) – are able to account for regional integration – or lack thereof – in 
many parts of the world. But we have to amend them beyond economic interdependence as enabling 
condition and include security interdependence (e.g. in Sub-Sahara Africa) as well as the survival interests 
of regimes, both democratic (Latin America) and authoritarian (Eurasia). Historical institutionalism (Pollack 
forthcoming), governance approaches (Börzel forthcoming) and social constructivism with a focus on col-
lective identities and community-building (Risse forthcoming) add to these accounts. 
However, there are two glaring exceptions. European integration theories hardly offer satisfactory ac-
counts for the lack of regional integration in North America and Northeast Asia despite very high levels of 
economic interdependence, together with a strong security dilemma (in Northeast Asia) with a potential 
of seriously interrupting economic exchanges in the case of crisis or war. The functional theories of inte-
gration presented in this paper simply mispredict the outcome in these two regions. Moreover, a common 
weakness of all theories is their neglect of informal institutions and diffusion effects. Theories of integra-
tion tend to assume that regionalism is about formal institution-building that develops in splendid isolation 
and that regional as well as national actors do not look beyond their particular part of the world and do 
not emulate institutional designs. In contrast, diffusion approaches offer a plausible account why regional 
cooperation and integration have spread around the world – as long as we do not expect institutional 
convergence, but selective adaptation of institutional designs and localization.
In sum, we opt for comparative regionalism as a strong litmus test for integration theories, since it helps to 
overcome the Euro-centrism of earlier scholarship (Acharya 2016). As a result, it has become an empirical 
question rather than a battleground for ontological or epistemological differences whether theories origi-
nally developed to account for the European experience travel to other world regions.  
18 | KFG Working Paper No. 85 | May 2018 
References
Acharya, Amitav 2016: Regionalism Beyond EU-Centrism, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 109-130.
Acharya, Amitav 2011: Engagement or Entrapment? Scholarship and Policymaking on Asian Regionalism, 
in: Review of International Studies 13/1, 12-17.
Acharya, Amitav 2009: Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism, Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Acharya, Amitav 2004: How Norms Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism, in: International Organization 58/2, 239-275.
Acharya, Amitav 2001: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge.
Adler, Emanuel 2013: Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions and Debates, in: 
Carlsnaes, Walter/Risse, Thomas/Simmons, Beth (eds): Handbook of International Relations, Sec-
ond Edition, London: Sage, 112-144.
Adler, Emanuel/Barnett, Michael (eds) 1998: Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Alter, Karen J./Hooghe, Liesbet 2016: Regional Dispute Settlement, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 538-558.
Apeldoorn, Baastian van/Horn Laura forthcoming: Critical Political Economy, in: Wiener, Antje/Börzel, Tan-
ja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp.
Bach, Daniel C. 2005: The Global Politics of Regionalism: Africa, in: Farrel, Mary/Hettne, Bjorn/Van Langen-
hove, Luk (eds): Global Politics of Regionalism.Theory and Practice, London and Ann Arbor, MI: 
Pluto Press, 171-186.
Barnett, Michael N./Solingen, Etel 2007: Designed to Fail or Failure to Design? The Origins and Legacy of 
the Arab League, in: Acharya, Amitav/Johnston, Alastair Iain (eds): Crafting Cooperation. Region-
al International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
180-220.
Bellamy, Richard/Lacey, Joseph forthcoming: Normative Political Theory and the EU, in: Wiener, Antje/
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, pp.
Bianculli, Andrea C. 2016: Latin America, in: Börzel, A. Tanja/Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 154-177.
Biermann, Felix/Guérin, Nina/Jagdhuber, Stefan/Rittberger, Berthold/Weiss, Moritz 2017: Political (non-)
reform in the euro crisis and the refugee crisis: a liberal intergovernmentalist explanation, in: 
Journal of European Public Policy, 1-21.
Börzel, Tanja A. forthcoming: Governance Approaches to European Integration, in: Wiener, Antje/Bör-
zel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2018: Researching the EU (Studies) Into Demise?, in: Journal of European Public Policy 
25/3, 475-485.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2016a: From EU Governance of Crisis to Crisis in EU Governance. Regulatory Failure, Re-
distributive Conflict, and Eurosceptic Publics, in: Journal of Common Market Studies. The JCMS 
Annual Review of the European Union in 2015 54/S1, 8-23.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2016b: Theories of Cooperation, Integration, and Governance, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, 
Thomas (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 41-63.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2016c: Theorizing Regionalism: Cooperation, Integration, and Governance, in: Börzel, A. 
 A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories | 19
Tanja/Risse, Thomas (eds): Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 41-63.
Börzel, Tanja A. 2013: Comparative Regionalism: European Integration and Beyond, in: Carlsnaes, Walter/
Risse, Thomas/Simmons, Beth A. (eds): Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 503-
530.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2018: From the Euro to the Schengen Crises: European Integration Theo-
ries, Politicization, and Identity Politics, in: Journal of European Public Policy 25/1, 83-108.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds) 2016a: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2016b: Three Cheers for Comparative Regionalism, in: Börzel, Tanja A./
Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 621-648.
Börzel, Tanja A./van Hüllen, Vera (eds) 2015a: Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations. Patching 
Together a Global Script, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Börzel, Tanja A./van Hüllen, Vera 2015b: Patching Together a Global Script: The Demand for and Supply 
of Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations, in: Börzel, Tanja A./van Hüllen, Vera (eds): 
Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations. Patching Together a Global Script, Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 245-259.
Caballero-Anthony, Mely 2008: Non-traditional Security in Asia, in: Cooper, Andrew F./Hughes, Christo-
pher W./De Lombaerde, Philippe (eds): Regionalisation and Global Governance. The Taming of 
Globalisation?, London: Routledge, 187-209.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2016: Regional Identities and Communities, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Reginoalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 559-578.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2013: Theoretical Pluralism in IR: Possibilities and Limits, in: Carlsnaes, Walter/Risse, 
Thomas/Simmons, Beth A. (eds): Handbook of International Relations, 2nd edition, London: Sage.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001: Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, in: International 
Organization 55/3, 553-588.
Clapham, Christopher 1996: Africa in the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Council of the European Union 2015: Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015  establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. 
OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 80–94, in: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex-
%3A32015D1601; 9 May 2018.  
Dent, Christopher 2012: Regional Leadership in East Asia: Japan and China as Contenders, in: Beeson, Mark/
Stubbs, Richard (eds): Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, London: Routledge, 252-263.
Deutsch, Karl W./Burrell, Sidney A./Kann, Robert A. 1957: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Diez, Thomas/Wiener, Antje forthcoming: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory, in: Wiener, Antje/
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, pp.
Francis, David J. 2006: Uniting Africa: Building Regional Security Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Garrett, Geoffrey/Kelemen, R. Daniel/Schulz, Heiner 1998: The European Court of Justice, National Govern-
ments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, in: International Organization 52/1, 149-176.
Galligan, Yvonne forthcoming: European Integration and Gender, in: Wiener, Antje/Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, 
Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
Graham, Kennedy 2008: Regionalisation and Responses to Armed Conflict, With Special Focus on Con-
flict Prevention and Peacekeeping, in: Cooper, Andrew F./Hughes, Christopher W./De Lombaerde, 
20 | KFG Working Paper No. 85 | May 2018 
Philippe (eds): Regionalisation and Global Governance. The Taming of Globalisation?, London: 
Routledge, 159-186.
Gruber, Lloyd 2000: Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Haas, Ernst B. 1964: Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Haas, Ernst B. 2001: Does Constructivism Subsume Neo-functionalism?, in: Christiansen, Thomas/Jor-
gensen, Knud Eric/Wiener, Antje (eds): The Social Construction of Europe, London: Sage, 22-31.
Hancock, Kathleen/Libman, Alexander 2016: Eurasia, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 202-224.
Hartmann, Christoph 2016: Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford Hand-
book of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271-294.
Hemmer, Christopher/Katzenstein, Peter J. 2002: Why There is No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Re-
gionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism, in: International Organization 56/3, 575-607.
Herbst, Jeffrey 2007: Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa, in: Acharya, Amitav/Johnston, Alastair Iain 
(eds): Crafting Cooperation. Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 129-144.
Hodson, Dermot/Puetter, Uwe 2018: Studying Europe after the Fall: Four Thoughts on Post-EU Studies, in: 
Journal of European Public Policy 25/3, 465-474.
Hoffmann, Stanley 1956: The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities, in: International 
Organization 10/3, 357-372.
Holbig, Heike 2015: The Plasticity of Regions: A Social Sciences–Cultural Studies Dialogue on Asia-Related 
Area Studies, in: GIGA Working Papers No 262, Hamburg.
Hooghe, Liesbet/Marks, Gary 2009: A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, in: British Journal of Political Science 39/1, 1-23.
Hooghe, Liesbet/Marks, Gary 2015: Delegation and pooling in international organizations, in: The Review 
of International Organizations 10/3, 305-328.
Iankova, Elena A./Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003: European Enlargement and Institutional Hypocrisy, in: Börzel, 
Tanja A./Cichowski, Rachel A. (eds): The State of the European Union Vol 6: Law, Politics and Soci-
ety, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 269-290.
Jetschke, Anja 2010: Do Regional Organizations Travel? European Integration, Diffusion and the Case of 
ASEAN, in: KFG Working Papers 17, Freie Universität, Berlin.
Jetschke, Anja/Katada, Saori 2016: Asia, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 225-248.
Jetschke, Anja/Murray, Philomena 2012: Diffusing Regional Integration: The EU and Southeast Asia, in: 
West European Politics 35/1, 174-191.
Jones, David M./Smith, Michael L. 2007: Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian 
Regional Order, in: International Security 32/1, 148-184.
Jones, Eric 2018: Towards A Theory of Disintegration, in: Journal of European Public Policy 25/3, 440-451.
Katsumata, Hiro 2009: ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating the West?, in: 
The Pacific Review 22/5, 619-637.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 2005: A World of Regions. Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter J./Shiraishi, Takashi (eds) 1997: Network Power: Japan and Asia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Kelemen, Daniel R. forthcoming: Federalism and European Integration, in: Wiener, Antje/Börzel, Tanja A./
 A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories | 21
Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
Keohane, Robert O. 1989: International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview.
Keohane, Robert O./Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 1977: Power and Interdependence, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Kleine, Mareike O. 2013: Informal Governance in the European Union. How Governments Make Interna-
tional Organizations Work, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kochenov, Dimitry/Pech, Laurent 2016: Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of 
Law Framework and its First Activation, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 54/5, 1062-1074.
Koitsch, Constanze 2012: Institutional Similarities Between Regional Organizations - An Analysis of ECOW-
AS and the Arab League, in: Goltermann, Lukas/Lohaus, Mathis/Striebinger, Kai/Börzel, Tanja A. 
(eds): Roads to Regionalism. Genesis, Design, and Effects of Regional Organizations, Aldershot: 
Ashgate.
Kreuder-Sonnen, Christian 2018: An Authoritarian Turn in Europe and European Studies?, in: Journal of 
European Public Policy 25/3, 452-464.
Lefkofridi, Zoe/Schmitter, Philippe C. 2015: Transcending or Descending? European Integration in Times of 
Crisis, in: European Political Science Review 7/1, 3-22.
Legro, Jeff W. 1996: Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step, in: Americal Polit-
ical Science Review 90/1, 118-137.
Lenz, Tobias/Marks, Gary 2016: Regional Institutional Design, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 513-537.
Lequesne, Christian forthcoming: Brexit and the Future of EU Theory, in: Diamond, Patrick/Nedergaard, 
Peter/Rosamund, Ben (eds): The Oxford Handbook on Brexit, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lindberg, Leon N. 1970: Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate 
Measurement., in: International Organization 24/4, 649-731.
Marks, Gary/Lenz, Tobias /Ceka, Besir 2013: Discovering Cooperation: A Constructivist Theory of Regional 
Organization, in: International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 3-6, 2013, San Fran-
cisco, US.
Matthijs, Matthias/Blyth, Mark (eds) 2015: The Future of the Euro, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milward, Alan S. 1992: The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.
Mitrany, David 1943: A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of Interna-
tional Organization, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Moravcsik, Andrew 1998: The Choice for Europe:  Social Purpose and State Power From Rome to Maas-
tricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew 1997: Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, in: Inter-
national Organization 51/4, 513-553.
Moravcsik, Andrew/Schimmelfennig, Frank forthcoming: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in: Wiener, Antje/
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, pp.
Nesadurai, Helen E.S. 2009: ASEAN and Regional Governance after the Cold War: From Regional Order to 
Regional Community, in: The Pacific Review 22/1, 91-118.
Niemann, Arne/Lefkofridi, Zoe/Schmitter, Philippe C. forthcoming: Neofunctionalism, in: Wiener, Antje/
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, pp.
Nye, Joseph S. 1970: Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model, in: International 
Organization 24/4, 796-835.
Oelsner, Andrea 2004: Consensus and Governance in Mercosur. Evolution of the South American Security 
22 | KFG Working Paper No. 85 | May 2018 
Agenda, in: Security Agenda 40/2, 191-121.
Okolo, Julius Emeka 1985: Integrative and Cooperative Regionalism: The Economic Community of West 
African States, in: International Organization 39/1, 121-153.
Oye, Kenneth A. (ed.) 1986: Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005: Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Pollack, Mark A. forthcoming: Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism, in: Wiener, Antje/Börzel, 
Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp.
Risse, Thomas forthcoming: Social Constructivism and European Integration, in: Wiener, Antje/Börzel, Tan-
ja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp.
Risse, Thomas 2016: The Diffusion of Regionalism, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87-108.
Risse, Thomas 2010: A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Rittberger, Berthold/Blauberger, Michael 2018: Introducing the Debate Section: “The EU in Crisis: EU Stud-
ies in Crisis?”, in: Journal of European Public Policy 25/3, 436-439.
Rittberger, Berthold/Schroeder, Philipp 2016: The Legitimacy of Regional Institutions, in: Börzel, Tanja A./
Risse, Thomas (eds): Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 579-599.
Rosamond, Ben 2016: Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration, in: Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 12/4, 864-871.
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2015: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Area Crisis, in: Journal of Europe-
an Public Policy 22/2, 177-195.
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2014: European Integration in the Euro Crisis. The Limits of Postfunctionalism, in: 
Journal of European Integration 36/3, 321-337.
Schmitter, Philippe C 1970a: Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around or Encapsulation?, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 9/1, 1-48.
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1970b: A Revised Theory of Regional Integration, in: International Organization 24/4, 
836-868.
Schmitter, Philippe C./Lefkofridi, Zoe 2016: Neo-functionalism as a Theory of Disintegration, in: Chinese 
Political Science Review 1/1, 1-29.
Söderbaum, Frederik 2016: Old, New, and Comparative Regionalism. The History and Scholarly Develop-
ment of the Field, in: Börzel, A. Tanja/Risse, Thomas (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 16-37.
Söderbaum, Fredrik 2004: The Political Economy of Regionalism. The Case of Southern Africa, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Söderbaum, Fredrik 2012: Formal and Informal Regionalism, in: Shaw, Timothy M./Grant, J. Andrew/Cor-
nelissen, Scarlett (eds): The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms Aldershote: Ashgate, 
51-67.
Söderbaum, Fredrik/Sbragia, Alberta M. 2010: EU Studies and ‘New Regionalism’: What Can Be Gained 
From Dialogue, in: European Integration 32/6, 95-117.
Valbjorn, Morten 2016: North Africa and the Middle East, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds): The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 249-270.
Van der Eijk, Cees/Franklin, Mark N. 2004: Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National 
Elections in Europe, in: Marks, Gary/Steenbergen, Marco R. (eds): European Integration and Po-
 A Litmus Test for European Integration Theories | 23
litical Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 32-50.
Wiener, Antje/Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (eds) forthcoming: European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Wodak, Ruth forthcoming: Discourse and European Integration, in: Wiener, Antje/Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, 
Thomas (eds): European Integration Theory, 3rd Ed.,Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
Wodak, Ruth 2015: The Politics of Fear. What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, London: Sage.
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and 
Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a funding program launched by 
the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft - DFG) in 2008. As a Research College, it is intended to provi-
de a scientifically stimulating environment for innovative research 
within a small group of senior and junior researchers. 
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe „The Transformative Power of Europe“ in-
vestigates how ideas spread across time and space. During its first 
phase of research, from 2008-2012, the KFG studied the diffusion 
of policy ideas and institutions within the European Union (EU), its 
candidates and neighborhood. During the second phase, from 2012-
2016, the KFG realigns its focus of interest on the diffusion of ideas, 
policies, and institutions beyond Europe (comparative regionalism) 
and the analysis of the EU at the receiving end of external influences. 
Its two main research areas are:
• The EU and Regional Institutions in Latin America, Africa, 
 the Middle East and Asia
• Europe and the EU and Recipients of Diffusion
